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This special issue brings together reflections that mark the thirtieth anniversary of 
the Revolutions of 1989 and their consequences for understanding European 
and global society. What seemed for some at least the surprising and rapid 
collapse of Eastern European state socialism prompted rethinking in social 
theory about the potential for emancipatory politics and new modes of social and 
political organization. At the same time there was increased reflection on the 
nature of varieties of capitalism and the meaning of socialism beyond the failure 
of at least its etatist and autarkic mode. The five articles here and the editors’ 
introduction address themes such as utopian hopes, civil society, the 
transformation of Europe, the world beyond 1989, and new configurations of 
power and conflict.  
 
Résumé 
Ce numéro spécial rassemble des réflexions portant sur le trentième anniversaire 
des révolutions de 1989 et examinant leurs conséquences afin de mieux 
comprendre la société européenne et mondiale. Ce qui est apparu pour certains 
au moins comme l’effondrement surprenant et rapide du socialisme étatique 
d’Europe de l’Est a incité à repenser, à partir des sciences sociales, le potentiel 
de politiques émancipatrices et de nouveaux modes d’organisation sociale et 
politique. Simultanément, la nature des différentes formes de capitalisme et le 
sens que prend le socialisme, au-delà de l’échec, au moins, de son mode 
2 
 
étatiste et autarcique, font l’objet de nombreuses réflexions. Les cinq articles 
regroupés ici et l’introduction des éditeurs abordent des thèmes tels que les 
espoirs utopiques, la société civile, la transformation de l’Europe, le monde au-
delà de 1989, et les nouvelles configurations de pouvoir et de conflit. 
 
The title of this collection of articles reflecting on thirty years after the fall of communism 
in Europe plays on the irony that the anti-communist revolutions were invoking the very 
slogans of popular power such as ‘Power to the People’ with which communism had 
once been associated.1 The themes addressed here, are those of the utopian hopes 
raised in 1989, the idea of civil society, the wider transformation of Europe, the world 
beyond 1989, and new configurations of international relations, power and conflict. 
These lead on to questions about the future of Europe across the former 'east' and 
'west' in a context of populist politics, new nationalisms and divisions. Regarding the 
occasion of this volume, we acknowledge that anniversaries are calendrical events and 
a single year should not be fetishized but rather at most stands symbolically for changes 
of longer durée. These articles do anyway address the legacies of the period 1989-91 
that culminated with the end of the Soviet Union. At the same time, for those of us in 
cultures organized around the passing of time, significant anniversaries can be points of 
reflection, evaluation and thinking about the future. Clearly there have been many 
changes of fortune and direction in the former communist societies since 1989 and 
there are serious questions to be raised as to whether we can still refer to the idea of 
‘post-communist transition’, or perhaps when it was we stopped doing so, and whether 
the region shares any fate in common simply by virtue of their formerly having been a 
part of the ‘eastern’ side of the Cold War. 
 
Particular years might carry such weight of significance as to be ‘turning points’, but we 
should be skeptical of these attributions. The English historian G.M. Trevelyan notably 
described the revolutions of 1848 as ‘the turning point at which history failed to turn’ 
(1979: 287) and writing on the twentieth anniversary of 1989, Agnes Heller refers to this 
as ‘the last great turning point of the twentieth century’ (Heller 2012: 56). Aside from the 
question of the actual legacies of 1848 that are beyond our remit here, these comments 
raise the question of the nature of history.  Is it a path with signposts on which it is 
possible to take proper turns (or fail to do so)? This is meant metaphorically of course 
and Trevelyan’s main interest was in how the revolutionary year of 1848 was followed 
by the reestablishment of autocracy across Europe in the 1850s. Yet in attempting to 
understand the legacies of 1989 social scientists face a not dissimilar puzzle in that the 
revolutionary optimism carried along by the uprisings, at least in Central and Eastern 
Europe, becomes difficult to sustain from the vantage of hindsight, and this is a view 
that predominates in the articles in this collection. Heller concluded that for the people of 
her generation ‘who treasure freedom, 1989 lived up to its promise’ but she still saw ‘no 
cause for triumph’ because the world faces unforeseen dangers and moreover, despite 
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the constitution of liberal institutions there was not yet a ‘spirit of democracy’ in central 
Europe (2012:56-7).  
 
These questions are particularly poignant in view of what was widely regarded as the 
unexpected nature of the anti-communist revolutions, which still gives rise to soul-
searching as to why social scientists were so ill-equipped to predict such extraordinary 
events (for example Howard and Walters 2014). Assuming we do not expect social 
scientists to be clairvoyants, and to have said exactly when the Berlin Wall would be 
breached, then there were analyses suggesting the systems would not survive 
indefinitely (on this see Outhwaite and Ray 2011). Marx himself of course had insisted 
that the condition of a successful Russian Revolution would be a supportive proletarian 
one in the west, implying that left to itself the Russian revolution would not survive.2 He 
would probably have been surprised though by how long the Soviet system, not to 
mention western capitalism too, managed to last. In 1970 Andre Amalrick asked 
whether the Soviet Union would survive until the fateful year 1984 predicting the 
country's breakup under the weight of social and ethnic antagonisms and a disastrous 
war with China (Amalrick 1970). Such expectations were not unreasonable, if also not 
widely held, in view of the presence of systemic dysfunctions and the repeated crises in 
the post-War decades, 1953, 1956, 1968 and the extended Polish turmoil through the 
1970s and 80s. Coinciding with the period of detente and Khrushchev’s reforms, Talcott 
Parsons, in his essay on evolutionary universals, famously predicted (in a sense rightly), 
that the Soviet Union would ‘either make adjustments in the direction of electoral 
democracy and a plural party system or “regress” into generally less advanced and 
politically less effective forms of organization’ (Parsons 1964:356). Likewise, Fehér et al 
(1984) argued the systems were both unreformable and ultimately unsustainable. These 
analyses raise crucial questions about the degree of organizational variation, and 
particularly political centralization, that is permissible as societies increase in social 
differentiation and complexity.  
 
The unexpected nature of the events of 1989-91 and their apparently transformative 
consequences for the world order prompted wide speculation about the future that could 
very roughly be understood in terms of optimists and pessimists (or ‘realists’). Leading 
among the optimists was Fukuyama’s (1992) ‘End of History’ thesis along with 
globalization-optimism epitomized by Thomas Friedman’s vision of a coming world of 
peace and prosperity (Friedman 2012). As Richard Sawka here points out, Habermas 
designated 1989 as ‘rectifying revolutions’ (die Nachholende Revolution) thereby 
suggesting a return to the past and a lack of innovation. But Habermas also, perhaps 
briefly, hoped that there would also be a ‘second chance’ to realize the idea of a 
communicative civil society in both East and West, but this time free from ‘Eurocentric 
narcissistic self-absorption’ (Habermas 1994:72). As Stephen Holmes noted, these 
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kinds of optimistic hopes were expressed particularly in the ‘long postcommunist 
decade’ 1989-2001 defined by the Fall of the Wall at the beginning and the fall of the 
Twin Towers at the end (Holmes 2001). Even so, prior to 2001 there were naysayers 
predicting that in the post-Cold War world things would not work out well. Writing in the 
Atlantic Review Robert Kaplan conjured a vision in which the ‘classificatory grid of 
nation-states is going to be replaced by a jagged-glass pattern of city-states, shanty-
states, nebulous and anarchic regionalisms—it is necessary to consider, finally, the 
whole question of war’ (Kaplan 1994). And with the civil war in Yugoslavia in the 
forefront of his thinking, Stjepan Meštrović predicted that this crisis ‘is a microcosm of 
the fate of Europe … everywhere post-Enlightenment narratives are clashing with 
…tradition, nationalism, fundamentalism, racism… The Disneyworld dream of a united 
Europe is unravelling’ (Mestrovic 1994: 192). Some of these pessimistic narratives, 
including Kaplan’s, were underpinned by Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ 
(Huntington 1996) written in response to his former student Fukuyama. According to 
Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes, Huntington unlike Fukuyama, was a best-seller in 
Russia having caught the illiberal mood of Russia’s ‘nationalist-minded intellectuals’ 
(Krastev and Holmes 2019: 119). 
 
If the initial debates over 1989-19 in the West were ranged across optimism and 
pessimism, it would be fair to say it is the latter that frame many contemporary 
analyses, including those in this volume. This is not an uncommon view that has 
emerged in many studies of the consequences of the transformation over the past three 
decades, confronting the messy reality of life in post-communist societies against the 
background of initial expectations. One example of this is Henri Vogt’s (2004) study 
based on interviews with participants in the events of 1989, from (former) 
Czechoslovakia, the DDR and Estonia, which develops a wider thesis on the nature and 
outcome of the revolutions. In particular, Vogt challenges the view of the 1989 
revolutions as anti-utopian revolutions of recuperation, as in Habermas’ concept, and 
suggests on the contrary that, ‘it is indeed a useful endeavour to think about the 
transformation from communism to democracy and a market economy through the lens 
of utopia’ (2004: 260). These were partially utopias of everyday life, such as desires for 
freedom of movement, an open and undefined future, free expression of collective 
identity, and choices about lifestyle, rather than imagined political blueprints for the 
future (2004: 213). These were to an extent fulfilled for many people, Vogt argues, in 
that many reported that their lives were much better than before the revolution, although 
not for others who report worsened living standards and strong dissatisfaction with how 
life after the system changes has panned out. At the same time, these utopias were not 
purely personal. There were also collective utopias of national community and solidarity 
and here Vogt found that there was less sense of fulfilment. There were tensions 
between ethnically-based nationalism and European cosmopolitanism, which are also 
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discussed extensively by Habermas of course (e.g. Habermas 1998). Perhaps utopian 
expectations will always be frustrated, a point Heller (2012) also makes, and in Vogt’s 
study disillusionment following 1989 is attributed to the ‘permanent consequences of 
uncertainty and contingency of the world’ (Vogt 2004: 132). By 1989, the societies of 
Eastern Europe had become profoundly atomized, interpersonal trust was low and 
social dynamism had been lost. In the following years, this was exacerbated by material 
factors as income inequalities increased, unemployment rose and poverty grew and 
became more visible than in the past, leaving lingering feelings of injustice. Similarly, 
Long’s (2005) interviews with former Czech dissidents reveal a mix of relief that the old 
order has passed but also disappointment with aspects of post-Communism, especially 
where they perceive a generational shift in values. The world of new freedoms brought 
a new future where people live in ambivalence between systems and in uncertainty in a 
society which is founded on individualism, self-direction and self-expression, as well as 
of competitiveness and consumerism.  
 
Unfulfilled Potential? 
A theme of many evaluations of the fate of 1989 has been that of unfulfilled potential. 
We do need to ask though, whose expectations and for what? Were these the hopes of 
western leftist intellectuals, former dissidents, or of workers? William Outhwaite voices 
the thematic sense of disappointment that the ‘victory of democracy’ turns out for the 
moment to be one of post-democracy and xenophobic populism across Europe and 
more widely. Quoting Heller (as above) on turning points, he argues that 1989 had a 
kind of beginning, in the founding of KOR3 in Poland in 1976 and subsequent events of 
the 1980s, although its ending could be seen in various ways. The role of Poland here is 
important since this could be seen, in Leninist terms, as the weakest link in the socialist 
chain – not only persistently unstable but the only state socialist society that produced a 
worker-based anti-communist opposition. Outhwaite emphasizes the varieties of 1989 
that manifested quite differently across the region as did the post-1989 transformations 
in their unevenness. Despite these varied forms of state and society following different 
path dependencies, Outhwaite suggests that there are significant aspects which 
distinguish the East’s ‘1989 years’ from the West’s. Apart from the two big thorns – the 
difficulty in building liberal democratic institutions and the issue of corruption, other 
differences include such issues as lustration and the weaponisation of politicians’ pasts 
as part of political battles, problematic privatization processes and unrestrained 
neoliberal reforms in the 1990s generating significant inequalities, and, partly as a 
consequence, Outhwaite argues in agreement with Chris Hann (in this volume), that 
there is a contemporary cultural clash between liberal urban intellectuals and the victims 




In these terms, and in relation to the more progressive hopes expressed by many 
around 1989 the process has taken another ‘wrong turn’. Outhwaite suggests that the 
foundations for this might have been set in the idea of western democracy as 
‘normality’, as an imitation of western models of governance, rather than releasing 
creativity and a search for something more original. This opened the way for 
conservative nationalists to insist on nativist authenticity. At the same time, and like 
others (e.g. Krastev and Holmes 2019), Outhwaite stresses that now, ‘populism and 
cultural conservatism or cultural counter-revolution have sprung up everywhere’ which 
he sees as ‘a warning against facile orientalizing’ of the region. The rise of populism 
across both East and West Outhwaite also sees as a reason we might consider 1989 
over, but expresses hopes that its liberal ideals will survive.  
 
Richard Sawka on the other hand, advances an almost apocalyptic pessimism while 
importantly reminding us that the trajectories of eastern and central Europe have been 
different from Russia and the post-Soviet world. Sakwa regards the original agenda of 
1989 as negative both in Habermas’s sense but also in repudiating not only what had 
come before, but also denying the political logic of communist power and the 
emancipatory potential of revolutionary socialism in its entirety. In the event, he 
suggests, while the negative agenda of 1989 has been fulfilled, it failed in the end to 
transcend the political logic of the systems that collapsed at that time. He makes the 
interesting suggestion that in Russia the potential of 1991, for a more pluralist 
international system allowing diverse paths to modernity in the post-Cold War world, 
was defeated by the agenda of 1989. In the end, he argues,1989 became more of a 
counter-rather than an anti-revolution and replicated, in an inverted form, the practices 
of the mature state socialist regimes. Therefore, the paucity of institutional and 
intellectual innovation arising from 1989 is striking. Its dominant motif was what he calls 
‘returnism’, that is, the attempt to join an established enterprise rather than transforming 
it. Sakwa develops this idea with reference to Girard’s concept of mimesis, so that 1989 
can be seen as mimetic revolution, in the sense that it emulated systems that were not 
organically developed in the societies in which they were implanted. For Eastern 
Europe, ‘returning’ to Europe (something that was voiced very widely at the time) 
appeared natural, but for Russia the civilizational challenge of post-communism was of 
an entirely different order. Here there could be no return and instead of a linear 
transition outlined by the classic transitological literature, Russia’s post-communism 
demonstrated that the history of others could not be mechanically transplanted from one 
society to another. Moreover, the return to Europe after 1989 more materially involved 
EU enlargement and NATO expansion into what it perceived to be a vacuum. However, 
this failed to take into account the power consequences of its actions when it 
encountered an alternative civilization in Eurasia, with its own complex and 
manifestations of modernity. Mimetic copying of the structures and systems of western 
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Europe was axiological in the sense that only one future model was possible, as 
opposed to dialogical in which all of the partners might change through their 
interactions.  
 
Mimesis has been a dominant theme of the post-89 years. Sakwa’s analysis is in some 
ways similar to the way mimesis is developed by Krastev and Holmes (2019) for whom 
CEE post-communist elites set out the project of returning to 'normality' but imported 
wholesale Western political and economic models and thereby embarked on a massive 
social experiment, despite themselves.4 The partial failure of these strategies and (not 
unlike the process Sakwa identifies in Russia) prompted the insistence by conservative 
populists of the possibility of a different ‘authentic’ Europe versus western secularism, 
multiculturalism and liberalism. This agenda was given additional impetus by the 
migration crisis leading to reactionary counter-elites capturing national identity. 
Meanwhile in Russia (as for Sawka) 1989-91 was not a liberation but a humiliating 
defeat. Thus for Krastev and Holmes Russia pretended to imitate the West but this was 
always a facade of 'Potemkin' constitutional structures that everyone knew were without 
meaning. The 'colour revolutions' in the 2000s coinciding with open opposition to Putin, 
showed the system was failing and opening to western influence. Putin then deflected 
opposition through an aggressive foreign policy (annexation of Crimea, occupation of 
the Donbas) not because he was worried by NATO ships in the Black Sea but as part of 
a 'retaliatory imitation.'  By occupying, interfering in elections, supporting Assad and so 
on Putin was holding up a mirror to the west, thereby saying we can be like you, and 
‘we have demonstrated that nobody can impose anything on us…. Nobody listened to 
us. Listen now’ (Krastev and Holmes 2019: 113). The upshot of these developments 
along with the collapse of the US’s ambitions to world leadership under Trump is that 
we have reached the end of the Age of Liberal Imitation and the Enlightenment project. 
One might say then that in answer to Outhwaite’s question, 1989 ended with the 
paradoxical collapse of global liberalism when the absence of super-power competition 
removed the need for the US to promote its values versus communist opponents.5   
 
Central to the post-1989 liberal imagination was the idea of civil society, which was also 
a concept for all seasons, with many potential meanings. Recent usage often sees civil 
society as a quasi-autonomous sphere separate from and possibly opposed to the 
state. This idea was based on an emerging public–private dichotomy which owes a lot 
to Habermas’s early work on the public sphere, where the core of civil society is a 
‘network of associations that institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on questions 
of general interest inside the framework of organized public spheres’ (Habermas, 1996: 
367). Civil society theories were concerned to defend the idea of a space for public 
debate and private association at a time when such liberal principles were not widely 
shared. The idea thus appeared to resonate with both the new social movement 
activism on anti-communist activism and suggest potential alternative forms of social 
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and political organization in the future. Adam Michnik (1999) for example saw these new 
networks as a ‘rebirth of civil society’, that also included ideas of ‘anti-political politics’ 
and ‘détente from below’. Here Chris Hann contrasts the ‘fuzzy concept’ with concrete 
realities that took shape in post-communist Hungary, specifically in the town of 
Kiskunhalas, in the Danube-Tisza interfluve.  
 
Seeking to put a finger on what went wrong, but in the sphere of ‘civil society’ Hann 
takes a critical distance from the concept itself and explores questions of the concrete 
(material) realities behind the discourses of civil society. He begins with a discussion of 
civil society as a prominent theme in dissident writings in East-Central Europe in late 
socialism which, initially advanced as a cure for the specific problems of totalitarian 
socialism, after 1989 was promoted more generally as a philosophy of governance. A 
key thesis is that political economy underpins a functioning civil society and that under 
post-socialism growing inequalities and social factures undermined social associations. 
Hann studies the gradual decline of associational life in Kiskunhalas after 1989 against 
the backdrop of a wider elitist discourse of civil society grounded in both a political 
binary that opposes state to society and in a civilizational divide between East and 
West. Hann draws on the contrasting intellectual traditions of on the one hand Ferenc 
Erdei and Ivan Szelenyi who advanced a materialist model for emancipation built on the 
embourgeoisement of the peasantry, and on the other hand that of Istvan Bibó and 
Elemer Hankiss who based their thinking on abstract liberal notions and paid little 
attention to political economy, advancing instead culturalist explanations for the decline 
of civic and associational life. Hann asks if the rhetorical promotion of civil society whilst 
ignoring the importance of material preconditions for a cohesive society ultimately 
produces cynicism towards political action and nostalgia for the secure forms of sociality 
in the old regime. In applying the framework of totalitarian theory to postcommunist 
antinomies – presenting these as a lingering dualism between atomized totalitarian 
society versus an authentic alternative of free associations, and with this, reproducing 
the language of a civilizational divide (East vs West), the new NGO-based discourse 
and practices of the ‘church of civil society’, Hann argues, have done little to bolster 
associational life across Hungary. The increasingly severe struggle for small-town 
Hungary to meet existential needs, the growing atomization of families through 
Westward migration, together with the privatization of formerly public space and the 
dismantling of the former material infrastructure for socialist associational life (such as 
cultural houses and trade union based associations and clubs), Hann demonstrates, 
have proven deleterious for civic life. From 2010 onwards it was Viktor Orbán’s ‘civil 
circles’ that attempted to capture society’s impulse for social cohesion at the grass roots 
– an illiberal programme built on, to use Sakwa’s Girardian lens, mimetic scapegoating 
(of migrants, Roma, Jews, western infiltrators and George Soros) and ultimately 
grounded in ‘incivility’. Hann concludes that a civil atmosphere of political debate does 
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not now exist at any level in contemporary Hungary. If civil society, Hann suggests, was 
the ‘gauntlet laid down by this region to social theorists a generation ago’, then the 
challenge today is to theorize the ‘incivility’ of the new populism. Echoing others here 
who refer to the global context for post-socialist transformations, he further suggests 
that these political processes are driven by the demise of socialist embourgeoisement 
(Ivan Szelenyi’s rural ‘socialist entrepreneurs’) in the face of a new national bourgeoisie 
under peripheral capitalism. He concludes that some of the moral responsibility for 
these developments lies with the unwavering intellectual enthusiasts of abstract 
liberalism. 
 
These arguments reflect a widely-held view that post-communist civil societies are 
‘structurally deficient’ in the sense of not providing an institutional mediation between 
state and citizens and a space for collective action. There is a wider discussion we 
could have here. For example, we might also make distinction between different 
concepts of civil society between liberal and pluralist underpinning of democracy, a 
tradition drawing on De Tocqueville in particular, and institutionalist ideas that focus on 
concepts of governance and polity that see state and civil society as mutually connected 
and reinforcing. Drawing more on the latter concept Cox and Gallai (2014) argue in 
relation to Hungarian health policy, that research needs to focus on how the 
interconnectedness of political and civil society provides a context and shapes the 
opportunity structures within which civil society organizations can operate and develop. 
Further, some commentators do find that many post-communist countries possess 
‘vigorous public spheres and active civil society organizations’ connected to 
transnational civic networks especially in east central Europe (Foa and Ekiert, 2017). 
Again, Johnson and Saarien (2011) argue that, through the lens of social movements 
working against gender violence in Putin’s Russia, there are significant signs of both 
retrenchment of NGOs but also survival of innovative local initiatives that have made 
inroads into state policy. Paradoxically, it is in the context of renewed authoritarianism 
and the prevalence of corruption that citizens might place more trust in civil 
organizations than state institutions, as Dani Marinova (2011) suggests. Indeed, she 
says, the void of lack of trust in the state can be filled by trust in the effectiveness and 
transactional capacity of civil associations (for example, NGOs, voluntary organizations, 
charity organizations, and church and religious organizations) even though there is 
limited focus on political mobilization and activism. This could be a kind of return of the 
circle to the idea of civil association as an alternative network to state agencies. Green 
(2012) develops this explicitly arguing that in a ‘teleological way’ the emergence of post-
Soviet Russia imagined the future a democratic one, in which civil society was an 
important part of the equation. However, the predatory illiberal state is rent-seeking but 
offers a new socio-economic equilibrium in which economic security is traded for 
political apathy and people organize their lives around personalized exchange in 
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informal networks. Loyalty to the state is very thin but activism can be found in local 
movements, such as ecological protests. 
 
On the other hand, Chris Hann’s observation of the failures of the rhetorical promotion 
of civil society complement Richard Sakwa’s disappointment with the failure of the anti-
revolutionary rhetoric of 1989 to transpire as such in practice. Both the ideas of civil 
society and of anti-revolution (or the related ‘anti-politics’ in the articulation of Poland’s 
Solidarność) appeared to unravel as abstract liberal notions deprived of a wider 
mobilisational capacity. Whilst claiming to repudiate the logic of revolution, the 
transitional project of the 1990s, Sakwa and others have argued, proved Bolshevism in 
reverse (see also Reddaway and Glinksi 2001; Burawoy and Verdery 1999:4). Similarly, 
others have examined the ways in which the discourse of civil society has similarly been 
utilized in the project of dismantling the socialist state by pitting civil society against the 
state and promoting neoliberalism’s emphasis on small states and self-responsible and 
entrepreneurial citizens active in civil society (Stoyanova 2019). These processes had 
mostly devastating effects for welfare states across the region. As Chris Hann argues, 
when populations struggle to meet basic needs, the civil societies of the liberal 
imaginaries of 1989 become impossible.  
 
One of the reasons for the ennui of frustrated expectations lay in the contradiction 
identified by Claus Offe (1991), at the beginning of this process, between 
simultaneously building capitalism and democracy. Collective participation through 
newly vibrant forms democratic association were always going to be limited by the path 
towards relative decoupling the state from the economy, privatization, market resource 
allocation, reducing costs and raising social and economic inequalities. Thus hope for 
transcending revolutions and new, vibrant politics largely went frustrated, and some 
have argued, the problem lay with these ideas’ propensity to drive precisely the 
opposite – ‘post-political’ technocratic governance – in the event foreclosing the 
properly political moment and making civil societies largely exclusive and elitist (Mouffe 
2005; Ost 2018; Stoyanova 2018). New, illiberal forms of politics seem to have emerged 
instead. Yet, considering how the new populist phenomenon has ‘sprung up 
everywhere’, as Outhwaite notes, rather than only to the east of the Berlin Wall, one is 
bound to consider it as a manifestation of the wider problem of renewed marginalization 
under global capitalism, as Chris Hann observes. Continuing this theme, Balihar 
Sanghera and Elmira Satybaldieva demonstrate in this volume some of the ways in 
which globalized rentier form of capitalism imposed in the post-Soviet space helps to 
reproduce deep inequalities in the region. Tomasz Zarycki similarly looks at the new 
forms of politico-economic dependencies in the post 1989 world order from a world 




Global systems and political economy of transitions  
The communist systems and their successors both operated within a structuring global 
context. Tomasz Zarycki links the fate of the post-89 transition to structural 
dependencies embedded in Polish history. Taking Poland as an example of Central-
European countries, he develops a structural comparison between the thirty post-
communist years and the earlier historical cycle, of the first three decades of the 
communist rule. Drawing (as does Sawka) on Viacheslav Morozov’s idea of the 
‘subaltern empire’ to describe the seeming paradox of the dependent nature of Soviet 
and Russian imperialism that Poland could be seen a victim of, he links these key 
phases of political change with the global context of persistent economic and cultural 
dependence, both in the communist period and beyond it. Zarycki’s analysis is based 
primarily on a world-system theory perspective in conjunction with a critical sociology of 
elites in which the political fractures of the latter were tied to the shifting formations of 
Polish modes of integration into the global system. He challenges the idea of the 
inevitable collapse of the system under the weight of its internal dysfunctions in favour 
of understanding a modernizing growth model under conditions of dependency. In the 
1970s a Moscow-dependent system gave way to ‘debt-ridden development’ of the entire 
region from double dependence on western capital and Soviet energy. During 1956-68 
there was a liberalization and relative autonomy in Polish fields of culture headed by an 
elite with internationalized cultural capital but facing increasing dissatisfaction with 
growing inequalities and slow growth. The elite came increasingly into conflict with a 
newly educated technocratic, nationalist and antisemitic aspiring elite that gained 
ascendancy after the 1968 purges. Moving forwards to the post-communist period, 
Zarycki suggests that there was an equivalent turning point, following the two electoral 
victories of the conservative Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) party and 
its presidential candidates: Lech Kaczyński elected in 2005 and Andrzej Duda elected in 
2015 and again in 2020. There was then a parallel between the ‘1968 moment’ and 
what he calls the ‘2005/15 moment.’ Both of these turning points can also be read as 
points of crises of the political effectiveness of earlier modernization ideologies. These 
were, respectively communism and then euro-enthusiastic democratization and neo-
liberal marketization. Zarycki’s key observation is that even if both 1970s and late 2010s 
can be considered as periods of relative political stabilization and economic growth for 
the region as such, and Poland in particular, they are related to considerable and even 
increasing economic dependence of Poland on the Western core. He concludes then 
that this approach, taking account of an understanding of the structural dependency of 
the region, may allow new light both on the nature of current dynamics in Polish politics 
as well as on the possible future trajectories of the country.  
 
Placing the post-communist ‘turns’ within a wider global context of political economy 
might assist the understanding of other political manifestations, including contested 
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issues around memory and national identity. In the Polish 1968 purge of 
‘cosmopolitans’, the ‘fifth column’ and a ‘well-organized Zionist conspiracy’ (all code-
words for ‘Jewish’) conflicts over modes of modernization and global integration 
generated illiberalism and antisemitic scapegoating. Now under the PiS government we 
have again seen this manifested in ‘memory wars’ over accounts of Poland under 
German occupation. These reflect in some ways illiberal ‘culture wars’ seen elsewhere 
and a kind of Girardian mimetic conflict over identity and the sacred object. One issue 
here is that the collapse of Communism enabled the liberation of the repressed 
alternative counter-memories of oppression and suffering under the communist rule. 
There was as international dimension to this too since the re-emergence of memory 
coincided with EU accession and Holocaust memory being instituted as the cornerstone 
of the European ‘transnational memory’, providing the EU with a ‘foundation myth’ and a 
moral yardstick for new member states’, as Levy and Sznaider (2007) put it. This 
generalization of Holocaust memory and commemoration, which was promoted by 
secular and liberal intellectuals and politicians, conflicted with what Nikolay Koposov 
calls ‘national romances’ that bring memory politics in the service of cultural patriotism 
and national heritage (Koposov 2018: 54). The disputes over Holocaust memory in 
Poland and the 2018 ‘defamation law’ (subsequently revised) prohibiting claims that ‘the 
Polish Nation’ was responsible or co-responsible for Nazi crimes, represent not only the 
illiberal turn but also the way post-communist elites have continued to be divided over 
the symbolic memory of the nation versus cosmopolitan identities and modes of 
integration into global structures.6  
 
In a further consideration of the global context, Sanghera and Satybaldieva focus on 
what went wrong in the post-Soviet space in economic terms. Rather than following in 
the footsteps of many who take the usual interest in corruption and attribute the 
economic woes of the region to legacies of the old regime and more or less deep 
seated incompatibilities between old habits and the new requirements of a market 
economy, Sanghera and Satybaldieva move our focus onto the very nature of the 
neoliberal model employed in the former Soviet space as the root cause of its failure to 
bring about the wellbeing and prosperity the revolutions promised thirty years ago. The 
authors draw on the distinction between the classical economists’ conception of the free 
market as “free of economic rent” and of capital as productive on the one hand, and the 
neoliberal forms of rentiership which characterize post-Soviet markets. Neoliberal 
reforms in the region, they argue, have allowed unproductive investors to extract 
income free of state regulation whilst accumulating enormous wealth and power. 
Focusing on Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan they argue that ‘post-Soviet oligarchs’ became 
an unproductive rentier class grounded in income from finance, land, natural resource 
rents, monopoly rent, spectrum rents (broadband frequencies), intellectual property and 
digital platforms. Their interviews with business practitioners reveal a moral economy of 
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cultures of corruption and debt obligations, patronage and highly unequal social 
relationships. A consequence of this they argue is that rentier oligarchs have ‘largely 
captured the post-Soviet landscape’ and generated plutocracy rather than democracy in 
the political system. 
 
Sanghera and Satybaldieva take an interest in the moral economy of the post-Soviet 
space – tapping into the moral sentiments, norms, and discourses people employ in 
order to justify, rationalize, and normalize the new economic relations in which they 
exist. Interviews with practitioners in banking, real estate, and the judiciary reveal that 
neoliberal values and rhetoric are being drawn upon to legitimize unjust and unequal 
relationships and practices. The language of consumer choice and market freedom 
serves to justify exorbitant interest rates and unfair contractual relations between 
lenders and borrowers, neoliberal thinking that puts exchange-value over use-value, as 
well as liberalized property laws that normalize the practices of speculation and 
extracting unearned income by the property-owning class. At the same time, they argue, 
judges draw on their duty to defend the law when they pronounce as unjust enrichment 
the behaviour of impoverished illegal settlers against landowners, in this way ratifying 
the power of the propertied class over the propertyless. It is commonly through 
corruption, fraudulent privatization, patronage and nepotism that access to valuable 
rent-extracting assets is gained and controlled, but it is the neoliberal reforms and 
concomitant thinking promoted and endorsed by Western governments and 
international financial institutions which legitimize and normalize the reproduction of 
inequalities generated by the rent-extracting sectors. Through criminal practices of 
primitive accumulation followed by legally and morally sanctioned defense of practices 
on the basis of neoliberal values, property rights, and the rule of law, rentiers have 
‘largely captured the post-Soviet landscape’, reproducing social inequalities, and 
generating plutocracy rather than democracy in the political system. In her study of 
worker’s experiences of neoliberalism in Kyrgzstan, Satybaldieva (2018) also finds both 
shame and resentment at the experience of inequality, the lack of social care and 
denigration by the authorities. This she argues gives rise to nostalgia for the Soviet 
system as a restorative moral discourse about dignity and an alternative vision of 
human flourishing.  
 
Sanghera and Satybaldieva’s work raise some further important questions about the 
role of the idea and practice of corruption. Since the late 1990s through the 2010s, 
public analyses of what is wrong with the transformation in Bulgaria for example (but 
also more widely in the region) were permeated by a scathing critique of corruption – 
both historicized as a legacy of the old regime and included in Orientalizing (and self-
Orientalizing) narratives as a cultural defect. Yet, Medarov and Tsoneva (2014) find that 
some liberal mainstream interpretations of corruption in late 1990s Bulgaria considered 
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the phenomenon acceptable as part of the initial processes of privatization and 
liberalization. As part of these, corruption was ‘[n]ot fatal, as it happens only once’ (ibid., 
p. 38) and seen as a necessary evil that would put assets into private hands – and out 
of the clutch of the state – following which the behaviour of the new entrepreneurs, 
these hopes went, would be regulated by the invisible hand of the market. When these 
expectations appeared increasingly frustrated, the liberal critique of corruption was 
oriented inwards, as part of a culturalist explanatory framework which sought to attribute 
corruption to institutional legacies of the former regime and to the corrupt cultures of 
bad (East European) business. Overall, the question of corruption then underpins an 
important tension between the needs of processes of primitive accumulation – 
necessary when building a capitalist order – and questions of moral ends (and means), 
and in the event, questions of democracy, since political power (and voice) appear to be 
highly contingent on economic power across the region.  
 
What is more, the rentierization of the Soviet space which Sanghera and Satybaldieva 
discuss, is not entirely a phenomenon characterizing the transformation of command 
economies into free market economies. The proliferation of rent-extracting sectors and 
of speculation characterize contemporary global financial capitalism. In this sense, 
these aspects of the post-Soviet transformation may not need to be considered as an 
aberration, but as following a wider trend of increasingly militant capitalism, which as 
Sanghera and Satybaldieva emphasize, is unproductive and hostile to human 
flourishing. Indeed, as Richard Sakwa in this volume observes, it is not only that the 
East tried to catch up with the West, the West also changed since 1989 – the collapse 
of the communist Other radicalized Western capitalism, letting neoliberalism rein free.  
 
In his 1990 book on the politics of anti-politics, David Ost remarks, ‘All those who talk 
about the “death of communism” miss the essential point: as reform proceeds apace, 
the slogans of Marxism will come into vogue once again” (1990: 213). Although signs of 
this are emerging across the world, what we have largely seen to the East of the Berlin 
Wall over the past decade is the emergence of the illiberal and anti-socialist hybrid of 
right wing populism. If one is to take a clue from Richard Sakwa’s distinction between 
anti-revolution and counter-revolution, then the answer to William Outhwaite’s question 
of when 1989 ended might need to wait until we see how the conflict between the 
revolutionary anti-communism of the liberal transformation and the counter-






These uncertainties about the significance of 1989 raise important questions about 
actual paths of transformation and their relationship with the organizational forms of 
western modernity. The unidimensional sociology of classical modernization theory 
mistakenly assumed an immanent tendency towards single organizational forms in 
modern societies but their global diversity suggests that there are more variegated 
routes into capitalist modernity. This will be briefly elaborated. Capitalism, along with 
different modes of articulation of local and global capital, appears to be compatible with 
multiple political and organizational structures. We might hope (as many of the 1989 
optimists did) that there is some sort of ‘elective affinity’ between capitalism and socially 
liberal politics, but the coexistence of capitalism with repressive systems in for example, 
Iran, China, and some post-Soviet states indicate otherwise. One lesson from 1989, 
should we have needed reminding, was that societal change always occurs in unique 
circumstances, and the availability of extant organizational models for emulation will 
give it an inescapably reflexive character, so (despite various efforts towards mimicry) 
one cannot self-consciously repeat phases of modernization that were once 
experienced unselfconsciously. Further, marketization was a key feature of post-
communist transitions, yet markets are never free-floating separate and distinct 
spheres, but are rather embedded in non-economic institutions, as Karl Polanyi (1957) 
and many since have argued. Thus post-communist societies were confronted by a 
diversity of capitalist paths (the American, British, German, Scandinavian, South Korean 
etc.) none of which could be exactly replicated, while attempting to do so resulted as 
József Böröcz argued at the time, in another simulated modernity, this time of western 
capitalism rather than socialism (Böröcz 1993). A further reason why we cannot assume 
any kind of neo-convergence among post-socialist societies and ‘the west’ arises from 
path dependencies (see for example Blokker 2005) and in particular the specific ways 
these societies emerged out of the 1989 that shaped subsequent political institutions 
and economic formations.  
 
At the same time, western political and economic systems underwent transformation in 
the decades since 1989, especially following the financial crisis of 2008, as they will 
again under the impact of COVID-19. It has been noted here that features of post-
socialism such as populism and rent-seeking capitalism can be found in the former 
‘west’ as well as the ‘east’. Across Europe traditional parties of the left seem to be in 
decline and were largely unable to capitalize on discontent from the 2008 crisis and 
neoliberal reforms that followed it. There has rather been mobilization around cultural, 
social, identarian and racist agendas framed in a Schmittian friend/foe rhetoric that 
threaten democratic institutions in western and eastern Europe. Brexit in many ways is 
the epitome of these in foregrounding a pastiche of invented Britishness, exclusivity, 
fear of immigration and nostalgia for a more ‘glorious’ past. These populist tendencies 
could be viewed as evidence of new convergence, and do in a way illustrate how 
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European societies across ‘west’ and ‘east’ shared post-2008 problems and responses. 
Nonetheless, we should be cautious in drawing this conclusion. ‘Populism’ is an over-
used concept, often rolling together nationalist, nativist, racist, left and right movements 
that should be more clearly separated (László, 2020). The agendas and political 
economy of these movements might be quite different. In the absence of local 
entrepreneurs, post-communist capitalism was often ‘capitalism from above’ managed 
through a combination of state patronage, illicit privatization and rentierism. If Szelenyi 
(2016) is right that ‘post-communism from China to Russia and to Eastern Europe may 
be converging on an illiberal prebendal system’ epitomized by Putinism, then we could 
be seeing a particularly post-communist political economy, even if this has echoes 
elsewhere.  
 
In these terms, Orbánism, which is often regarded as the epitome of modern populism 
and illiberalism could be seen as a characteristically post-communist project. Rhetorical 
hostility to global and EU forces, including the expulsion of the CEU, is combined with 
leaving the transnational economic sector untouched, while developing extensive lines 
of local patronage and rent-seeking through the economy, media and justice system 
(Meyer-Sahling and Jager 2012). Brexit, on the other hand, another populist 
manifestation, originated in the UK’s historical structural marginality from core EU 
institutions, its position as non-euro member while possessing the offshore financial 
centre of the euro-zone and multiple post-2008 divergence in macro-political economy 
(Thompson 2017). We suggest then that while there might be convergences between 
politics and economy across Europe it would be over-stretching this to suggest that 
there is a project of post-89 neo-modernization. The particular forms of political 
economy emerge from the singularity of these societies and their pre- and post-89 
trajectories.   
 
How then should we view the place of 1989-91 in the course of history? One answer to 
this question might be that it signalled the end of the post-WW2 order, which was also in 
many ways a disorder, that was starting to fragment from the collapse of Bretton Woods 
in 1971. Since 1989 we have been witnessing the formation of a new geopolitical order 
and regimes of local and global accumulation. In some ways, this has seen a tri-partite 
conflict between the 'West', Russia and China but this is an asymmetric conflict in which 
struggles for hegemony over physical space and cyberspace, political and economic 
influence assemble in complex ways. In addition, one could read Trump as an 
acknowledgement that although 1989-91 appeared to be a triumph for US hegemony, in 
fact it signalled its decline in that the US and USSR were symbiotic partners in global 
hegemony. How significant 1989 will appear in longer-term historical perspective is 
impossible to say (one is reminded of Elias's comment that historians in the future could 
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regard the present age as 'late barbarism' [Elias 1994: 230]) especially as the effects of 
the climate emergency coalesce with the pandemic. 
 
Turning points such as 1989, along with 1968 and the current moment of turbulence, 
are clearly crisis moments – when current forms of politics get challenged and new 
visions articulated. Points like these bring about elevated hopes and expectations for 
more or less radical change and whatever set of new political ideologies gets to embody 
these new hopes and expectations is bound to be held accountable for its failure to fulfil 
them. The popular will of 1968 sought to hold state socialist elites to account for their 
failure to fulfil the potential of 1944-45. 1989, as Richard Sakwa argues in his 
contribution, emerged from the failure of 1968 and in this sense can be seen as the 
institutionalized radicalization of the popular charge levelled 20 years before. The 
current crisis of liberalism can similarly be seen as a reaction to the failure of 1989 – the 
frustration of the hopes and expectations projected onto the politics of euro-enthusiastic 
market liberalism is once again being manifested in street protest mobilizations and at 
the ballot box. It is as yet unclear just what the consequences of the unfulfilled promise 
of 1989 are going to be – could there be a sudden, self-driven (and bloodless) 
unravelling of liberalism similar to the ‘velvet’ unravelling of state socialism in 1989?  
 
Although drawing parallels of this sort is always a risky endeavor, some of the 
articulations of the crisis moments of 1989 and the one we are living though now are 
striking. Both in 1989 and today in Bulgaria, for example, a key rhetorical weapon 
against both state socialism and liberal capitalism is the notion of ‘truth’. It permeated 
much of the revolutionary discourses of the 1989-90 period. One of the key protests 
against the regime in 1989-90 was a tent occupation of Sofia’s central square, dubbed 
the ‘City of Truth’ [Gradut na Istinata] and led by a movement that called itself ‘Civic 
Movement in the Name of Truth’ [Grazhdansko Dvizhenie v Imeto na Istinata]. Key to 
their demands was to gain access to ‘the truth’ about the repressions during the regime, 
the authorities’ concealment of information about the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, the 
biographies of officials who held important positions in the cabinet, and other suspected 
‘secrets’ or ‘crimes’ of the regime. A similar rhetorical elevation of the concept of ‘truth’ 
can be observed today in Bulgaria (at least since the protest mobilizations of 2013 
[Stoyanova 2018]) which are often articulated as protest campaigns seeking the ‘truth’ 
about the post-1989 ‘transition’ – particularly concerning the process of privatization of 
state assets, and the wider (re)distribution of economic and political power after 1989. 
Similar tendencies can also be observed elsewhere, particularly if one is to take the 
wider debate of ‘fake news’ which permeate both liberal and illiberal narratives. Notions 
of ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood’ appear to be key to political conflict across both East and West 
today. We argue that rather than being part of more general moralizing protest 
discourse, this search for ‘truth’ is linked to the cycles of political promise-making at the 
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major ‘turning points’ discussed here – 1968, 1989, and today. The unfulfilled potential 
of each seems to drive each ‘turning point’.    
 
The past 30 years then have seen some dramatic changes, but not always in line with 
the elevated hopes and aspirations of many in 1989. The reassessment of the scores of 
optimist and pessimist predictions at the time invite questions of whose hopes and 
expectations, and for what. Was Fukuyama’s declaration of the coming of a peaceful 
world that has rid itself of ideological conflict an optimistic narrative against the 
background of thirty years of reforms which Richard Sakwa describes as linear and 
returnist, William Outhwaite regrets as uninnovative, Chris Hann identifies as 
exclusionary, and others denounce as post-political and post-democratic (Crouch 2000; 
Mouffe 2005)? With hindsight, whose predictions at the time were more optimistic – 
those of the post-ideological world of Francis Fukuyama or those of the return of Marxist 
slogans of David Ost? The answers to why the aspirations for postmodern anti-
revolutions and for free and dynamic civil societies turned into realities of counter-
revolutions and ‘incivility’ are of course many. Some of the answers contributed in this 
collection point to the geopolitical realities of power grabbing (Sakwa), the hubris of 
intellectual elites (Hann), the problem of corruption for the consolidation of liberal 
democracies (Outhwaite), the reproduction of rabid inequalities in rentier capitalism 
(Sanghera and Satybaldieva), and the problem of structural dependencies (Zarycki) 
which the global liberal capitalist order depends on. Could things have gone another 
way? If the celebrated aim in 1989 was to end ideological conflict and ‘return to 
normality', could we have ever built anything other than a shanty version of what was 
already there? Could alternative political models be conjured up without a clash of 
ideas, could privatization of state assets go into private hands without corruption, could 
people learn to trust institutions which were increasingly missing (being ‘rolled back’)? 
Indeed, could the call to suffer through traumatic socio-economic reforms withstand 
beyond the realization that the promised land contained as Sakwa says here, ‘only more 






1 The inspiration for these articles was a symposium at the University of Kent in June 2019, 
organized by the editors, addressing the theme of the thirtieth anniversary of the collapse of 
communism in Europe in 1989. 
2 In the 1882 preface to the Russian edition of the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels said: 
‘If the Russian revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that 
each complements the other, the present Russian common ownership of land may serve as the 
starting point for a communist revolution’ (Marx and Engels, 2009: 12). 
3 Komitet Obrony Robotnikó, Workers' Defense Committee, founded by Antoni Macierewicz was 
a precoursor of Solidarity  
4 It is important to note though that while post-communist elites might have striven for imitation, 
what they got, at least in the first decade or so, was a brutal form of capitalism and 
infrastructural collapse that did not mirror anything in western Europe at the time. 
5 It could be said though their thesis is limited to the duration of the careers of some key 
politicians. Trump, Orbán, Kaczyński, Putin and Trump will pass. Have the societies or political 
elites from which they came also changed to the extent that there could be no return to previous 
more liberal trajectories? They did not envisage the kind of global mass mobilization we are 
currently witnessing in Black Lives Matter. Nor, of course, being written in 2019, could they 
consider the possible political consequences of COVID-19 especially for those illiberal regimes 
that are failing to contain it. 
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